GOALS OF AMERICA'S ASIAN ALLIANCES
US alliances in East Asia aim to serve several broad goals. The first is to (1) deter attacks on allied nations. South Korea has the most heightened threat: the alliance seeks to protect South Korea from attack by North Korea. Additionally, in recent years the region has seen an intensification of island disputes between China and its neighbors in the South China Sea, and between China and Japan in the East China Sea. 17 Proponents of US engagement in the region cite the deterrent role played by American alliances, and by the US military presence that they facilitate. 18 Second, US alliances in East Asia further the goal of (2) maintaining regional stability in a region of great economic and political significance. The notion of regional stability encompasses several different ideas:
• Prevention of nuclear spread. The United States government takes the position that the spread of nuclear weapons is detrimental to international stability. It pledged under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty to cooperate to reduce the spread of nuclear weapons, and to reduce the size of its own arsenal over time. In East Asia, US alliance commitments are partly aimed at reducing the likelihood of nuclear spread throughout the region through the provision of a nuclear umbrella to Japan and South Korea.
• Prevention of conventional arms races. Due to historical animosities, territorial disputes, and the growth of Chinese power, East Asian countries may feel mistrust and uncertainty that would lead them to build up their conventional military power. Through the logic of the security dilemma (in which one country's effort to increase its own security reduces the security of another), this has the potential to fuel arms racing. 19 Such arms racing would hinder beneficial economic relations in the region, would be inefficient for the global economy, could sour broader political relations, and could raise the risk of conventional conflict. The United States aims to reduce arms races in East Asia by guaranteeing the security of several states in the region, and by maintaining a powerful military presence there.
• Free and uninterrupted access to sea lanes. The United States (specifically the US Seventh Fleet, based on Yokosuka, Japan) is the dominant naval power in a region home to some of the busiest trade routes in the world. The prosperity of the United States (as well as China, South Korea, Japan, and so on) relies upon the uninterrupted flow of shipping through regional sea lanes. Analysts argue that the interruption of those trade flows due to war or terrorist attacks would create supply chain problems and other costly economic disruptions. The smooth flow of sea traffic, military as well as commercial, depends on managing threats such as piracy, and on the region's respect for the law of the sea. The UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) governs the sovereignty, rights of transit, and economic rights to the millions of miles of coastline and thousands of islands throughout the region. 20 • Generally cooperative relations among US allies and partners. The United States benefits from friendly relations among like-minded countries in East Asia. Close ties among these countries reduce the likelihood of regional disputes and crises, and facilitate diplomacy in a variety of realms. Good state-level relations among the United States and these countries improves the lives of their very intermingled people, who intermarry, work, and travel in these countries.
Third, (3) the US seeks to keep these countries "on its team"-namely, within the US political orbit (and, by definition, out of a rival political orbit). 21 A country can be said to be in the US political orbit if it has friendly relations and broadly overlapping national interests with the United States, and if it frequently cooperates with Washington. Many analysts argue that countries in the US orbit are more likely to be receptive to concluding trade and other economic agreements. 22 They are more likely to cooperate with US diplomatic goals, and to cooperate militarily (such as training with the US military, providing overflight routes, and even contributing forces for US-led military operations). Countries in the US orbit are more likely to ally with the United States if trouble arises and less likely to succumb to external pressure.
While military alliances (i.e., security guarantees or mutual defense agreements) send a clear sign that a country lies within the US orbit, "orbit" and "alliance" are not synonymous.
Israel, for example, is within the US orbit; it cooperates broadly with the United States in many different realms (including national security) without a formal defense agreement. Many other countries occupy this category: Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and (previously) Egypt.
In some analysts' eyes, the United States has a fourth critical goal, as important of any of the above: namely, the goal of maintaining US military power and presence in the region. They argue that the United States has an interest in having substantial power in Asia due to its importance: the region's economic dynamism and the emergence of China. Such analysts see power projection capabilities and military presence as an end in and of itself.
By contrast, I treat US military presence and power projection in East Asia as a means to an end: to deter, to contain, to assure, to stabilize. The questions, examined in this chapter, are whether US military presence and commitments actually promote these goals, and whether the gains are worth the costs and risks they bring.
A final word about liberalism. After all, a plank of US foreign policy writ large is to encourage the spread of democracy and to promote US values abroad. In Asia, the United States promoted the development of democracy in Japan, and explains continued support for Taiwan in part by noting shared democratic values. Washington today encourages nascent political reform in Myanmar. 23 However, democracy promotion has not been a first-order goal in Asia: for 37 Observers attribute China's assertive policies to a long, patient strategy of "salami tactics" in which China increasingly seeks to dominate the region by changing the "facts on the ground" one step at a time. 38 US alliances with the Philippines and Japan, by linking these countries to the region's military superpower, help deter Chinese aggression in these regional territorial disputes. In the absence of the US commitments, Philippine military weakness, and the anticipation of a weak response from Japan, 39 might convince the Chinese government that it might successfully advance its interests through faits accompli. The Chinese Communist Party, facing challenges to its domestic legitimacy and an increasingly nationalistic and noisy populace, has political incentives for diversionary efforts. 40 Such pressures may grow increasingly intense at a time of declining Chinese economic growth. 41 In a climate of increasing Chinese assertiveness in its territorial claims (an assertiveness that is only likely to grow), 42 America's Asian alliances help deter Beijing from using force.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation
US alliances unquestionably reduce the spread of nuclear weapons in East Asia. Japan and South Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons is still possible even within the context of their relationship with the United States, but nuclear and conventional US security guarantees make this outcome much less likely.
Out of the various factors that affect countries' decisions to acquire nuclear weapons, the security motivation is among the most powerful. 43 According to this explanation, countries will acquire nuclear weapons if they are facing a potentially hostile actor that acquires nuclear weapons, or that outmatches them conventionally. Scholars have also found, however, that proliferation can be reduced through security guarantees-that sometimes threatened actors will not acquire nuclear weapons if they can rely on an ally's protection. 44 According to this logic, the loss of a security guarantee would encourage the abandoned and threatened ally to decide to acquire nuclear weapons. that are non-nuclear states and NPT signatories).
As for Japan, the end of the US-Japan alliance could indeed lead Tokyo to acquire nuclear weapons. Given that during the Cold War the Soviets were bristling with nuclear weapons, and that the Chinese and North Koreans also acquired them, Japan probably would have acquired nuclear weapons by now absent the US nuclear umbrella. As Prime Minister Sato
Eisaku told the US ambassador in 1964, "it is common sense that we should possess nuclear weapons if everyone else does." 48 Japanese leaders for decades have declared that acquiring nuclear weapons would not violate Japan's constitution. 49 Today, Japan lives next to an avowedly hostile North Korea-which not only has nuclear weapons, but threatens to turn Japanese cities into a "sea of fire." Japan lives among nuclear-armed Russia, and a nuclear-armed China that is modernizing its maritime forces, and increasingly sending them into what Tokyo believes to be Japanese territorial waters. Given this strategic environment, it is very possible that absent the US security guarantee, Japan would feel compelled to acquire an independent nuclear weapons capability.
But Japan's nuclear acquisition in this situation should not be seen as a foregone conclusion. 50 Japan's people are highly anti-nuclear since suffering two nuclear strikes by the United States in World War II, as well as a 1954 domestic crisis over the "Lucky Dragon" fishing boat, whose crew and catch was irradiated by US nuclear testing. Antinuclear sentiment was reinvigorated after the 2011 tsunami and nuclear disaster at Fukushima. A decision to acquire nuclear weapons would thus be politically fraught and costly. 51 Externally, Japan's acquisition of nuclear weapons could have undesirable effects because Japan's neighbors are sensitive to increases in Japan's military power. Finally, Japan is an NPT member and (as the sole country to have suffered nuclear attacks) has taken a leadership role in the global nonproliferation effort. A turnabout of this magnitude would be a dramatic move decried by many Japanese, and by many other countries.
Given domestic, regional, and global sensitivities, given Japan's more secure status as an island nation, and given its strong maritime military capabilities, Tokyo might therefore decide against acquiring nuclear weapons, at least in the short or medium term. It might quietly take steps that moved Japan closer to a nuclear-weapons capability-an approach designed to shorten the time it would take to deploy a full nuclear deterrent while avoiding the costs associated with nuclear acquisition. Japan's large stockpile of plutonium would greatly facilitate development of such a "virtual" nuclear deterrent. 52 In sum, absent US security guarantees, nuclear weapons would likely spread to South
Korea and possibly to Japan. Some scholars would not be troubled by this prospect: some view the spread of nuclear weapons as stabilizing in world politics, arguing that (because nuclear weapons raise the costs of war) nuclear weapons deter wars among states that possess them.
Furthermore, such scholars would view the countries in question (Japan and the ROK) as responsible stewards of nuclear technology-being democratic, technologically advanced, wealthy, and politically stable. 53 But the bottom line is that the end of US security guarantees in East Asia would almost certainly lead to the spread of nuclear weapons to Korea and might lead to nuclear spread to Japan.
Arms Racing
The withdrawal of US security guarantees in East Asia could lead elevated threat perception and arms racing dynamics. 54 US security guarantees reduce the amount of military capabilities that these countries need to build in order to protect themselves, and thus reduce how threatening they appear to their neighbors. An end to the security guarantees means that countries would perceive the need to acquire the capabilities to conduct the missions that the United States has largely performed, which could have the effect of increasing a sense of insecurity and fueling arms racing. The effects of arms racing are uncertain; international relations scholarship has had trouble demonstrating that arms races lead to war. 55 Arms races do, however, significantly sour political relations. As countries begin to observe each other's improvements in military capabilities, and as they increasingly see them as aimed at undermining their own security, competition in the military realm spills over into the political and societal realms, poisoning formerly amicable relations.
For example, under the US-ROK alliance, the South Koreans have focused on ground forces, with the United States carrying the heaviest burden of air and naval forces for Korea contingencies. The result is that Seoul has not built as much capability that could reach and worry Japan. As for Japan, alliance with the United States has enabled it to acquire less military capability than it otherwise would, particularly in the area of air and naval forces. 56 In the absence of a US security guarantee, Japan would likely increase its military spending, the pace of its training, and (given the North Korean missile threat) its offensive and preemptive strike capabilities. It would also likely pursue legal reforms, such as revision of Article 9 of Japan's "Peace Constitution," that would provide the institutional framework for a more assertive foreign policy. 57 Thus in the absence of US security guarantees, both Japan and the ROK would likely increase their conventional military spending, and would do so in ways that might alarm the other. This would be taking place in a climate of chilly relations between Seoul and Tokyo, in a region in which the Chinese have been engaged in a vigorous program of military modernization.
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International relations scholarship highlights several factors that affect the severity of the security dilemma, and the likelihood of arms racing, in East Asia. Scholars have pointed out that maritime geography has a palliative effect on threat perception: "the stopping power of water" (in John Mearsheimer's words) complicates offensive military operations, deterring would-be aggressors, and reassuring would-be targets. 59 Arms racing dynamics in maritime East Asia should thus be less severe relative to continental regions. 60 Other factors beyond geography raise concerns about East Asian arms racing. Asia's maritime geography does dampen the security dilemma by reducing fears of homeland invasion.
But countries worry about more than the threat of homeland invasion; one of the most relevant threats in East Asia are territorial disputes. In these disputes, aspects of maritime warfareincluding first-mover advantage-exert a destabilizing influence. 61 Furthermore, identity politics in East Asia-rooted in resentment over historical issues, and animated through nationalistic politics in the region -increase threat perception and make the security dilemma more severe. In other words, in China and South Korea, Japanese moves to increase its power projection capability would be viewed through the lens of Japan's failure to acknowledge or repudiate past aggression. 62 All of these factors elevate the risk of regional arms racing in the absence of American security guarantees.
Freedom in the Sea Lanes
US alliances in East Asia support the US maritime presence in the region, which is said to provide a public good of ensuring freedom of passage through the vital East Asian sea lanes.
Writes Barry Posen, "US military power underwrites world trade, travel, global telecommunications, and commercial remote sensing, which all depend on peace and order in the commons." 63 Would the absence of the US military presence in East Asia threaten this peace and order in the commons? And would an end to US military dominance in the sea lanes undermine US national security goals in other ways?
When answering these questions, it's important to distinguish between peacetime and wartime conditions. In peacetime, the US Seventh Fleet patrols the sea lanes, provides maritime assistance, and engages in counter-piracy activity in cooperation with other East Asian countries.
It trains and learns regional waters. The US Navy is on location in the event that disaster strikes, so can provide rapid humanitarian assistance, as it did following the Indian Ocean tsunami In sum, US naval predominance in East Asia is not necessary but is useful for the US to engage in the kinds of activities (both supportive and coercive) that Washington might want to engage in. Allies provide the United States with a regional base network that increases efficiencies and reduces force requirements. The US naval presence enhances the missions of assurance and deterrence, and contributes to US soft power.
Good Relations Among Partners
Although some American partners in East Asia have warm relations, American alliances do not necessarily translate to good relations among partners (and in some cases may do the opposite 71 Within the ROK, Japan remains a useful target that politicians can attack for domestic political gain-on the issues of history textbook coverage, demands for apologies for wartime misdeeds, and the Tokdo/Takeshima islands disputed by the two countries. 72 In Japan, conservative leaders, catering to influential constituencies, assert sovereignty over disputed islands and favor history telling that omits Japan's historic aggression. 73 All of this ill will has festered despite sixty-plus years of longstanding American alliances with both countries.
Some evidence suggests that, rather than encourage amity among allies, US commitments may actually do the reverse-allowing allies to nurse grievances. James Schoff and 
Political Orbit
Do US security guarantees in East Asia keep Japan, the ROK, and other countries within the "US orbit," and would a withdrawal from those alliances push those countries into Beijing's arms? Although a Chinese economic orbit is already emerging, uncertainties exist about a) the extent to which this will translate to regional political leadership, and b) even if it does, whether countries in the region would tilt toward Beijing.
China's stunning economic rise has already transformed regional (and global) trade and financial flows, giving rise to a Chinese economic orbit. 78 China has become the number-one trading partner for Australia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and
Vietnam, among others. China's currency has joined the ranks of the world's most influential The extent to which China's economic influence will translate to the creation of a powerful Chinese political orbit-to which countries in a "post-American Asia" would be attracted and deferential-is uncertain. First, China has risen in the context of a half-century old political and economic system created by the United States and its liberal partners after World War II. China's ability to displace this system is very much in question. As John Ikenberry writes, "The capitalist democratic world is a powerful constituency for the preservation-and, indeed, extension-of the existing international order. If China intends to rise up and challenge the existing order, it has a much more daunting task than simply confronting the United
States." 82 Not only does China confront a regional and international system that, in Ikenberry's words, is "hard to overturn," Beijing arguably has a strong interest in not overturning it. China has profited immensely from the current order, and its future prosperity (and thus the resilience of the CCP) depends on its access to trading partners within this nondiscriminatory trading system. More likely, rather than seek to create a different system that challenges the current regional order, Beijing will seek greater influence within it. Such behavior is already evident in China's efforts to reform existing institutions (such as the greater influence it has sought and received at the IMF and World Bank), and to create new institutions (such as the AIIB) that allow Beijing to exercise greater influence. 83 Observers are divided on how receptive Asian countries would be to the pull of a Chinese orbit. In the early years of China's rise, neighbors responded positively to its growing power; at that time, Chinese diplomacy emphasized multinational coordination within regional institutions and compromise in territorial disputes. 84 Some scholars argue that China's neighbors will not resist and will defer to growing Chinese power-in part due to regional norms of hierarchy (the regional dominance of the "Middle Kingdom" during the 17th and early 18th centuries). 85 According to this view, countries in a "post-American Asia" would embrace
Beijing's orbit.
By contrast, another view holds that even in the absence of American alliances, countries (though they may be economically close to China) would not necessarily defer to Chinese political leadership. This position is supported by evidence of regional dismay at China's growing assertiveness in its territorial disputes, and by broader unease about Chinese intentions. 86 Beijing's diplomacy aside, scholars who believe in a powerful balancing tendency in international politics would argue that power and geography alone would make it likely that Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the ROK would balance against a rising China. 87 The extent to which countries in a "post-American Asia" would fall into China's orbit would vary by country. Southeast Asian countries-even diplomatically unified (which they are not)-are too weak (economically and militarily) and too economically dependent on China to offer a counterweight to Chinese power. In the absence of its alliance with the United States, the Philippines (despite its disputes with Beijing) would have no choice but to accept Chinese regional leadership.
South Korea has already moved toward Beijing. Seoul is hedging between the two great powers: it maintains its alliance with the United States but diplomatically has moved close to China, its most important economic partner, and the country that holds the greatest sway over North Korea. 88 Hugh White argues, "China simply has too many cards to play on issues that matter to Seoul for it to be willing to break with China in any but the most extreme circumstances." 89 Indeed, South Korea has demonstrated acceptance of Chinese regional leadership and has distanced itself from anything that might resemble an anti-China coalition. 90 It has done so chiefly by distancing itself from Tokyo: rejecting closer security cooperation, 91 stoking domestic rancor over history disputes, 92 and crafting with China a shared anti-Japanese identity. 93 Seoul's drift toward Beijing should not be exaggerated: Korea has a longstanding strategic tradition ("shrimp among whales") of navigating among great powers. 94 This tradition suggests that South Korea's approach in a China-led Asia would resemble its current approach in US-led Asia: Seoul would seek to cultivate friendly ties with both great powers, but would create distance when doing so advanced its interests.
Japan would be (and already is) most resistant to a Chinese orbit in East Asia. With its large economy and capable military (and its water buffer between itself and China), Japan enjoys the greatest freedom of action. Japan has a territorial dispute and tense political relations with China, making it more inclined to resist attempts at Chinese encroachment. Japan-quite unlike its neighbors-has already resisted China's attempt to enlarge its regional orbit through the creation of the AIIB; Tokyo and Washington conspicuously refused to sign on. 95 The extent to which Japan would be willing to balance against China is debatable; Japan faces a serious demographic crisis that will reduce future economic growth, 96 and the Japanese people evince strong opposition to raising defense spending or increasing the country's military activism.
in the absence of the US-Japan alliance, relative to any other country in the region, Japan is the least likely to fall into a Chinese orbit.
COSTS AND RISKS OF US ALLIANCES IN EAST ASIA
The above assessment of US alliances suggests that they advance many, though not all, US security goals. Most importantly, the alliances strengthen deterrence, prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and prevent regional arms racing. The next important issue to consider is whether these alliances promote these US national security goals at an acceptable level of cost and risk.
Financial Cost
The United States spends more on defense than any country in the world: more, indeed, than the next seven countries combined. American defense budget for 2014 was $610 billion. there. 100 Were the United States to end its alliance relationships with those countries and simply reassign those forces elsewhere (to the United States or to another foreign base), this move would yield no savings (and may indeed cost more unless sent to another country paying host nation support). Thus the relevant comparison is to compare the cost of those troops stationed in East Asia against the prospect of both bringing those troops home and decommissioning them.
If the troops were both brought home and decommissioned, this would result in savings for the United States.
Calculating the exact expense of stationing US troops in allied countries is difficult.
Rather than calculate the cost of stationing forces in a particular country, analysts have tried to estimate the savings of shifting to a more restrained grand strategy, which would end US security guarantees not only to Asian allies but also to NATO-thus enabling the United States to save in the force structure required to uphold those security guarantees. An estimate by the Cato Institute calculated in this fashion reported cost savings of $1.2 trillion over the next decade. 101 According to their analysis, the end-strength of the army and Marine Corps would be cut by one-third; the United States would field eight rather than 12 carrier battle groups and would cut a commensurate number of ships from the navy; it would cut six fighter wing equivalents from the air force. These cuts would permit further administrative savings.
In sum, budgetary savings could be substantial, but to realize those savings the United
States would need to change its policy of providing peacetime presence and preparing for wartime contingencies; it would need to bring its forces home and decommission them.
Assuming that the United States intends to keep a strong regional forward presence, basing US forces in Japan or South Korea may even save money because those countries pay host nation support. Force structure can be reduced, and cost savings realized, if and only if the United States reduced its regional forward military presence-which would mean a change in its broader grand strategy.
A US-China Arms Race
While (as described earlier) America's Asian alliances likely reduce the incidence of arms racing among regional countries, US alliances are fueling an arms race between the United States and China. 102 America's alliance commitments obligate it to maintain the ability to project massive force into the region in order to come to the defense of its allies. But, as argued earlier, with its increased military power, and its pursuit of an "anti-access, area denial" (A2/AD) strategy, China is eroding the ability of the US military to introduce force into the region. 103 This starts to call into question the credibility of US alliances: alliances will be credible only if an ally has the military capabilities to fulfill its obligations. So the US should not seek to achieve its global strategy by pursuing absolute military superiority in Chinese coastal waters and threatening the country's security." 106 In sum, in an era of growing Chinese military power, US alliance commitments in East Asia are leading the United States to take steps that Beijing will view as highly inflammatory-which, in the event of crisis over one of their multiple flashpoints, create serious escalation risks.
Some critics would counter that this vision of East Asia might never become reality.
China, like other countries previously expected to unseat the United States, may see its growth falter, making it unable to challenge the United States in the Pacific. Many "China bears" make compelling arguments that predict a Chinese slowdown, and indeed one has already begun. 107 Other critics might argue that China will eschew a grand strategy of driving the United States out of the region. 108 Some analysts persuasively argue that a "revisionist" grand strategy would be costly and detrimental to China's interests. 109 Perhaps, then, China will not challenge continued US military dominance in the Pacific.
To be sure, China's growth has already slowed, and China will likely reject a highly confrontational, revisionist grand strategy. But the United States should nonetheless be worried about the future. First, China has already acquired a great deal of wealth; the relative size of its economy is already larger than was the Soviet Union, which for a half-century presented a formidable geopolitical challenge to the United States. As Joshua Itzkowitz Shifrinson points out, Imperial Japan pursued regional domination when its per capita GDP was barely a third of the United States. 110 And China need not pursue a revisionist grand strategy to pose serious security challenges to the United States-threatening US access to the region, jeopardizing the credibility of US alliance commitments, and creating friction with Washington. 111 Concerns about arms racing are not speculation about the future, but about the current state of US-China relations.
Entanglement
US alliances in Asia create risks of entanglement in wars that the United States otherwise need not fight. Scholars note that although alliances can help a country balance against a security threat, they confer entanglement risks. "Entanglement" is when a state "is compelled to aid an ally in a costly and unprofitable enterprise because of the alliance" ("entrapment" is a subset of entanglement caused by an ally's risky or aggressive actions). 112 Kim argues that because of these risks, countries craft alliance agreements carefully to reduce the likelihood of being dragged into war by an aggressive ally over an issue of little strategic import. Japan and the Philippines. Until recently, the US-Japan alliance was long characterized by Japan's fears of entanglement; for seventy years the Japanese resisted being dragged into one of America's adventures (in Korea, Vietnam, or the Persian Gulf), and feared finding itself in the middle of a US-Soviet nuclear exchange. 117 Today, however, things are different: the growth of Chinese power, and China's increased threat to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands now mean that Japan risks entangling the United States in a war with a nuclear-armed adversary. US officials (including President Obama) have announced that although Washington does not take a position on the sovereignty of the islands, they do indeed fall under the US-Japan security treaty because they are "administered" by Japan. Thus, the entanglement risk in the US-Japan alliance-for a half-century predominantly borne by Tokyo-today has shifted toward the United States. 
Buck-Passing
Critics of the current US grand strategy identify "buck-passing" as one of its costs.
Indeed, current US national security policy has encouraged buck-passing among friendly and potentially militarily powerful countries. As Barry Posen writes, America's Cold War alliances "have provided US partners in Europe and Asia with such a high level of insurance that they have been able to steadily shrink their militaries and outsource their defense to Washington."
Since the end of the Cold War, European countries that previously contributed to balancing against the Soviet Union now collectively spend only 1.6 percent of the GDP on defense-lower than either the United States or the global average in defense spending. 120 Similarly, Tokyo (during and since the Cold War) has pursued a low level of defense spending for a great power-less than one percent of its GDP. Japan's high GDP means that this is a nontrivial sum, so even with this low level of effort, Japan developed a capable maritime military force. 121 However Japan's level of defense effort, and its regional and global leadership, could be far greater. Critics of US grand strategy argue that an important negative effect of the US commitment to Japan is that it has led one of the most potentially powerful countries in the world, a wealthy liberal democracy friendly to the United States, to act as a secondary diplomatic and military power.
Importantly, Japanese buck-passing is not an unfortunate cost of the current grand strategy: it is a goal of the current grand strategy. Allied buck-passing means that countries are not balancing against the preponderance of American power. Furthermore, allied buck-passing means that countries in key regions are not building up independent capabilities that could trigger security dilemma dynamics. As discussed earlier, the prevention of arms racing is an explicit US national security goal. Therefore, far from being a cost of the current grand strategy, allied buck-passing is the manifestation of its goals being achieved.
Confusion may stem from the fact that proponents of the current US grand strategy sometimes call for greater allied burden sharing. Indeed, American officials have over the years negotiated with Tokyo to increase to increase its host nation support, level of military capability, and activism in different alliance roles. In particular, Congress and US officials in the Nixon and
Carter administrations sought greater Japanese burden sharing, and Japan's inaction (despite its large financial donation) to the first Persian Gulf War triggered criticism in the United States.
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Although Washington would prefer that Japan contribute more to the alliance, this
should not be misconstrued as a desire for a change in the East Asian distribution of power.
Under deep engagement, an underperforming Japan, rather than an unfortunate side effect of the current US grand strategy, is a desired outcome. The fact that American blood and American treasure substitute for what could be Japanese balancing-lamented by Posen as "welfare for the rich" 123 -is a necessary requirement of this grand strategy.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR AMERICA'S ASIAN ALLIANCES
As described earlier, US alliances in East Asia advance some national security goals but not others; they also come with important costs and risks. Given US budgetary realities, and given changes in East Asia's strategic environment, how should Washington change its national security policies vis-à-vis these alliances to advance US national security goals, while minimizing Singapore. Alternatively, the United States could project military power into the region from Alaska, Guam, and Hawaii (currently major hubs for US Pacific forces). The point is that "alliance" and "military presence" should not be conflated, and the arguments for both must be assessed independently.
Withdrawal from Alliances
With this in mind, one possible course is for the United States to withdraw from some or all of its East Asian alliances. 124 Advocates of "offshore balancing" or "restraint" argue that if
China did emerge as threatening to its neighbors, the rich and capable countries in East Asia could themselves balance against it. If the United States were to itself buck-pass to the countries most proximate and most affected by China's rise, this would confer significant savings in US defense if the current US force structure for the ROK and Japanese alliances was decommissioned. American buck-passing would also encourage greater national security efforts by Japan: giving the United States a like-minded, militarily capable foreign-policy actor with which Washington could cooperate in the region. Most importantly, an end to these security guarantees would reduce serious dangers that they bring: the growing spiral of distrust in USChina relations (only exacerbated by the recent "pivot"), and the risks of entanglement in regional military crises or war.
Withdrawal from these alliances would of course undermine other American national security goals. The end of US alliances with South Korea and Japan would likely lead to nuclear spread to the former, and possibly to the latter. In the absence of the US alliances, as Japan adopted a more assertive regional role, and as South Korea developed more maritime capabilities, this could lead to elevated regional tensions and arms racing among Australia, China, Japan, and 
Reforming US Alliances
Given that the United States is likely to retain its grand strategy of deep engagement, Washington should reform its East Asian alliances so to make them less dangerous, more useful, and more sustainable. arrangement, that ally should be incapable of independent defense against the threat it faces; its defense should have vital strategic import to the United States; and ideally the alliance should also confer a low risk of entanglement.
The MDT between South Korea and the United States was initially designed as a "terminal," but because of changing strategic circumstances, it should be reformed into a "hub."
The alliance was created at a time when South Korea was militarily weak, and was outmanned and outgunned by an economically dynamic North Korea. The Korean peninsula was seen as a key "domino" in America's Cold War strategy of containment of Soviet communism. Given all of this, the United States agreed to defend South Korea under an arrangement in which South Korea refused to allow base usage for other regional operations, and refused to allow military personnel or assets on the peninsula to be used "off-pen."
All of these strategic circumstances have changed; the US-ROK alliance thus cries out for reform. South Korea no longer meets the criteria to be a "terminal"-it is more than capable of defending itself against a weak adversary, and the alliance brings a high entanglement risk to the United States. If Washington decides to keep this alliance, it should be reformed into serving a broader strategic purpose-namely, by making it into a regional and global hub. The current posture is expensive because the United States has to buy adequate force structure to support its deployment on the peninsula, which then serves no other regional or global role. In keeping with this theme of creating a more flexible hub, the United States should also transition its forces in ROK away from ground forces toward a naval forward presence.
These trends have already begun, and should be continued. In recent years the United
States has adopted a posture of "strategic flexibility" in which US forces in Korea will evolve into a high-mobility, expeditionary force. 128 And as part of this, the United States has negotiated with Seoul to relax its regulations against using US assets (personnel and materiel) on the peninsula elsewhere in the region. Some such assets were thus dispatched to a US-Japan joint exercise in In general, however, Washington should resist a trend in which a more threatened Japan is expecting US military protection while being less willing to host US forces. Of course, the US military must conduct its operations in Okinawa so that its people are safe; it must deal respectfully with Okinawans; and must understand Tokyo's dilemmas as it negotiates with the prefecture that bears such a high share of the US defense burden. But ultimately, the 70-year old deal between the United States and Japan-that the United States will protect Japan, and Japan will provide the bases-would no longer be much of a deal if (at a time when Japan is more threatened and more of an entanglement risk) Japan wants the United States to protect it offshore and at higher expense. If Washington intends to maintain the alliance, it should thus maintain a "hub" in Okinawa. Similarly, as the evolution of the US-Philippine alliance continues, and as the United States negotiates for renewed access to Philippine bases, these same ideas should also be applied. 131 Dual Deterrence. Changing strategic conditions in East Asia also suggest changes in US alliance diplomacy. China's growing maritime power, and its increased assertiveness over its island claims, have raised the salience of island disputes in the South China and East China Seas.
Inflammatory Japanese policies-such as Tokyo's 2012 purchase of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands from its private owner, an action that Washington urged against, 132 risk creating crises and wars into which the United States could be dragged. Washington should thus adopt, in its alliances with Japan and the Philippines, policies that reduce the risk of entanglement. As Michael
Beckley describes, such policies include "dual deterrence" and "loopholes" that reduce the chance of the US military having to fight a war with China over islets in the South or East China
Seas. 133 For example, though Washington describes its security commitment to defend the Philippines as "ironclad," 134 it has reduced its entanglement risk through a loophole. Washington maintains that because sovereignty over the Spratly Islands is disputed, the United States does not have an obligation to defend territory that is not clearly part of the Philippines.
Given increased entanglement risks, Washington should adopt a strategy of "dual" or "pivotal" deterrence in its alliances with Manila and Tokyo. 135 It has already pursued such a strategy in the Taiwan Strait; this was particularly necessary during the tenure of Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian, who routinely engaged in actions that provoked diplomatic crises with China. According to the logic of dual deterrence, Washington should express its intention to uphold its security obligations, and should warn China of the consequences of using force to resolve its territorial disputes. On the other hand, Washington should warn its allies of the consequences of them engaging in provocative actions. In the case of Taiwan Washington is unlikely to be so fearful of a US-China spiral such that it would end American alliances in the region, American military leaders and foreign policy officials should be looking for ways in which they can adapt US policy so to avoid creating undue fear in Beijing. In sum, in this era of strategic and budgetary change, in which Americans continue to support the country's Asian alliances, foreign policy leaders should fix these alliances in ways that minimize their costs and risks, and better serve the US strategic interest.
